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Abstract 
The European Patent System consists of 
national patent offices (NPOs) and the 
supranational European Patent Office (EPO).  
EPO and the NPOs have granted patents in 
Europe side-by-side since 1980. The 
resulting patent system is complicated and 
less coordinated than might be expected. 
Firms must consider a number of variables 
when selecting the route of patenting they 
take within this system: price, rigour of 
examination, duration of examination, 
quality of legal redress. To date there is little 
descriptive evidence on how firms choose 
between EPO and national offices. This paper 
provides a rich descriptive analysis of 
patenting in Europe. We analyze how origin, 
size  and technological focus of companies, 
affect how they choose among patent offices 
within the EPS and report differences in 
examination durations and grant rates across 
patent offices. 
 
Keywords:  Patents, European Patent 
System, Validation 
THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM  4 
The European Patent System: A 
Descriptive Analysis 
The European Patent System (EPS) has 
consisted of National Offices (NPOs) and the 
European Patent Office (EPO) since 1978.1 
The administrative rules governing the EPS 
have changed numerous times, be it because 
of administrative changes (e.g. adjustments 
to fee schedules and patent office rules), legal 
changes (e.g. patentability of genes) or due to 
judicial decisions (e.g. on parallel imports). 
The current paper makes no attempt to survey 
the history of these changes, some of which 
are reviewed by Plomer (2015). Its purpose is 
to document how the EPS has been and is 
being used by companies that patent 
inventions.  
There is a literature which analyses 
aspects of how the EPS functions and that we 
do not review in detail here. This literature is 
surprisingly small. Hall & Helmers (2018) 
analyse accession of a series of countries to 
the EPS. Mejer & Van Pottelsberghe (2012) 
study the functioning of the EPS at an 
aggregate level and document the complexity 
of the current system, the genesis of which is 
laid out by Plomer (2015). Validation of 
patents within the EPS is analysed by 
Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, & Van Pottelsberghe 
(2009) and in Harhoff, Hoisl, Vandeput, & 
Van Pottelsberghe (2016). These papers do 
not provide the detailed description of how 
the EPS is used that we provide here. 
A much larger literature uses data 
from the EPO to analyse various aspects of 
companies’ patenting behaviour in Europe. 
Some of this work is surveyed by Harhoff & 
                                               
1 van Pottelsberghe  (2014) defines the EPS as “the policy mechanisms, jurisdictions, and institutions in Europe which 
allow inventors to acquire and enforce industrial property rights over their inventions.”  
2 Two recent reports that have provided some insight into the correlations between use of IP and jobs in Europe and 
are published by EU IPO (Webpage last accessed on the 18.8.2018).  
Hall (2012). This literature has not so far used 
data from NPOs in Europe.  
This paper is descriptive: it outlines 
how companies use the patent system, not 
why they make the choices we document. 
Such a descriptive analysis may be useful for 
those embarking on analytical projects, 
which seek to uncover causal effects of 
administrative, legal or judicial reforms. It 
may also be helpful as a record of how the 
EPS worked prior to the significant legal and 
administrative changes that will be brought 
about when the Unitary Patent and the 
Unified Patent Court begin to operate in the 
near future. We note that while our 
descriptive analysis is intended to present 
facts about the use of patents in Europe, none 
of the graphs presented below can be read as 
showing that there are causal relationships 
between the variables we describe. In 
analyses of patent data policy makers are 
often interested to understand whether 
stronger or broader protection has effects on 
job creation, productivity or economic 
growth.2 This paper does not engage directly 
with these questions and does not adopt 
forms of analysis that are suited to 
uncovering causal effects. We do provide 
some comparative analysis of patenting that 
raises questions about future potential for 
growth based on innovation in some 
European countries. An answer to these 
questions will require a different approach 
from that adopted here. 
The main aim of our paper is to set out 
facts about the EPS which are presented in 
the form of graphs and tables. To structure 
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the analysis, we set out questions about the 
EPS. These are broadly motivated by the 
desire to understand how companies use the 
EPS to protect patentable inventions. 
The paper is structured as follows: 
first we set out the motivating questions, then 
we present results and discussion of these. 
Following this we provide details of the data 
and the methods used to construct it.3 As a 
general point we should emphasize that the 
results presented below generally encompass 
patents granted either by EPO or at least one 
NPO unless this is otherwise stated. Where 
patents from the same patent family are 
granted by both the EPO and the NPO we 
count both. A detailed analysis of such 
double patents is relegated to the appendix. 
 
Motivation 
The EPO has a unique role within the 
EPS. It offers patent applicants the service of 
a one-stop-shop for the process of obtaining 
a granted patent. Should the applicant obtain 
a granted patent they must then validate the 
patent with those national offices (NPOs) in 
which the patent is to take effect. Validation 
allows companies to customize the size of the 
territory within which they wish their patents 
to take effect. Once companies have 
validated a patent and started to pay fees to 
NPOs they can always reduce the territorial 
extent of protection by allowing their patent 
to lapse in some countries. They cannot later 
extend protection to countries in which the 
patent was not validated after grant. As time 
has passed and the EPS has expanded to 
additional countries, firms seeking extensive 
                                               
3 This structure is unusual, as most articles will present data construction and methodological details before providing 
the main findings. As this paper is mainly descriptive and most of our analysis does not involve statistical or 
mathematical methods we believe that relegating details of data construction and methods to later sections of this 
paper is in the interest of our readers. 
territorial protection for their patents would 
have increasingly found the EPO to be the 
more attractive office for patent examination 
and maintenance. 
Alternatively companies can submit 
their patents to one or more NPOs directly. 
Generally speaking, submitting an 
application to EPO is more attractive as the 
number of territories within the EPS in which 
the patent is to be enforced increases and if 
the EPO is more likely to grant a patent than 
some of the NPOs. 
This leads us to three questions: 
1. Have companies used the EPO with 
increasing frequency as time has passed? 
2. If so, have all types of companies used the 
EPO with increasing frequency as time 
has passed? Here we consider country of 
origin, size of the company and 
technology focus as dimensions along 
which we differentiate company type. 
3. Is the EPO more or less strict in 
examining patents than the NPOs and 
does it examine more or less quickly? 
In addition, we extend the analysis of country 
origin of applicants to show how portfolios of 
granted patents of companies from France, 
Germany and Great Britain have developed 
during the last 3 decades. The comparison 
reveals strong differences across these three 
countries that deserve further analysis. 
 
Results 
Creation of the EPO simplified the 
patent application process for companies 
which sought patent protection in multiple 
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European 4  countries. The main advantage 
was a reduction in costs of obtaining a 
granted patent. Furthermore, the 
administrative burden was reduced, as 
companies negotiate with only one office 
over the text of the patent application. The 
main disadvantage of using this procedure is 
the risk associated with a rejection by EPO. It 
is conceivable that EPO might reject the 
patent application while one or more NPOs 
would not. In practice applicants tend to 
mitigate the risk of EPO rejection by 
applying to one NPO before subsequently 
also applying to EPO. In most cases the 
national application is later dropped5.  
 
Figure 1: Granted patents in the EPS. Own calculations 
based on data obtained from PATSTAT 2016. The data 
exclude utility models (Gebrauchsmuster) that are granted 
by DPMA(DE), OP(AT), UIBM(IT) and OEPM(ES). 
Turning to Question 1 we provide two 
figures. Figure 1 shows the total number of 
applications that resulted in a granted patent 
within the EPS. The total number of 
individual applications resulting in granted 
patents submitted to EPO has been higher 
                                               
4 EPO provides patent protection within the EPS territory. Currently EPS includes 38 countries, while it only 
consisted of 8 member states in 1978. 
5 We analyse the case of double patents, where the national application is granted in parallel to the EPO application, 
in the methodology section below. 
6 The ten largest patent offices by patents granted between 1978 and 2012 within the EPS are set out in Table 1 in the 
appendix. These comprise DPMA (DE), INPI (FR), UK IPO (GB), UIBM (IT), OEP(AT), OEPM (ES), IGE(CH), 
RVO(NL), PRV(SE), OPRI (BE).  
than the total number of applications 
resulting in granted patents submitted to the 
10 largest national offices6 within the EPS 
since 2002. There is a slight trend for a 
widening of the gap between the NPOs and 
the EPO, but there is also clearly a lot of 
variation, which is driven by relative fees and 
changes to administrative procedures. The 
sensitivity of applications to fees set within 
the EPS is explored in detail by Harhoff, 
Garanasvili, & von Graevenitz, (2018). 
Figure 1 also shows some data for the 
largest national offices. Their ranking as set 
out in Table 1 is fairly stable over time, with 
DPMA (DE), INPI (FR) and IPO UK (GB) 
granting the highest number of patents. 
Notice that the data contained in the 
PATSTAT database on patents granted in 
Italy is likely to be unreliable. 
Since patents granted by EPO are 
only valid in an EPS member state once they 
have been validated there, the comparison 
between patents granted by EPO and patents 
granted by the NPOs may be unhelpful for 
some purposes.  
Figure 2 provides a comparison 
between the total level of patents granted by 
the largest 10 NPOs and the total number of 
patents validated within the EPS after grant 
by EPO. The median patent granted by EPO 
results in 6 validations. Figure 2 shows that 
once validations are taken into account the 
EPO grants the majority of patents that are in 
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force in the territory covered by the EPS and 
this has been the case for three decades. 
 
 
Figure 2: Patents validated within the EPS after grant by 
EPO. The drop off in validations and national grants after 
2014 is the result of grant lags. It does not indicate a real 
drop in validations and grants. 
We explore details of the validation 
behaviour of companies further below. 
Figures 1 and 2 raise the question 
which types of companies use which offices. 
This question has multiple dimensions: the 
size of the company, its country of origin, the 
technology it focuses on and number of 
countries within which the company seeks to 
protect the patent are explored below.  
 
Size of Companies 
The size of each company would 
ideally be measured through assets or the 
number of employees. This would require a 
matching between the applicant names from 
PATSTAT and from company registers. 
Such a matching exists only very partially 
and due to the limitations of publicly 
available company registers it does not 
extend to the vast majority of patentees. We 
use the size of the companies’ patent 
portfolios to approximate company size here. 
                                               
7 If one restricts analysis to European companies only, then the proportion of single patent portfolios at the NPOs 
rises to 71.1% and remains at 63.8% for EPO. 
This still requires a significant effort in 
cleaning and matching company names 
within PATSTAT. This work is described in 
the methodology section. 
Figure 3 shows which fraction of 
companies had obtained portfolios of granted 
patents from either the 10 largest NPOs 
within the EPS or from EPO by 2010. It 
shows that the fraction of companies holding 
a single patent is 63.4% for EPO while it is 
69.5% at the NPOs. These numbers are likely 
biased upwards by our inability to correctly 
identify all company groups, but there is no 
reason to assume that the bias is significantly 
higher in the data from the NPOs.7  
 
 
Figure 3: Patent portfolio sizes in 2015 - Log-log plot of 
fraction of applicants with patent portfolio of a given size 
based on all patents granted by EPO or NPOs before 2015. 
This indicates that the NPOs are 
somewhat more important for the very 
smallest companies seeking to obtain patent 
protection within the EPS. Our data indicate 
that the fraction of companies holding more 
than 2 patents in their portfolio is always 
higher at EPO than at the NPOs.  For the 
owners of very large patent portfolios we are 
much more likely to have identified the size 
of the portfolios correctly. Figure 3 also 
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shows that the largest portfolios at EPO are 
of a similar size to the largest portfolios 
within the NPOs. Table 2 in the Appendix 
lists the owners of the largest 25 portfolios at 
EPO and within the NPOs. The portfolios are 
based on the sum of all patents granted by 
either type of office by 2016. Table 2 reveals 
that many of the largest companies obtain 
granted patents from both EPO and some 
NPOs. It also provides a hint of what might 
motivate these larger companies to prefer 
either EPO or the NPOs: large manufacturers 
of chemical or pharmaceutical products tend 
to be more frequent in the top 25 applicants 
at EPO as are large companies not 
headquartered in Europe. The most 
significant technology institutes supported by 
national governments are prominent amongst 
the top 25 portfolios at the NPOs. Of the 
companies that are headquartered in Europe 
many rely on the NPOs as well as EPO. 
 
Country of Origin 
Table 3 provides a similar analysis at 
the level of the country of origin of the 
applicant company. This table needs to be 
read with a pinch of salt as the inventors 
could well have a different nationality from 
that attached to the company and the patent 
may well have originated in a research 
facility in a different country too. Ignoring 
such details Table 3 shows that companies 
from the top 5 countries using EPO are also 
among the companies from the top 6 
countries using the NPOs. Italy is the only 
country not in the top 5 countries of origin at 
EPO that is in the top 5 countries of origin at 
the NPOs. Taking this a little further we can 
analyse the ratio of the number of patents 
going to the NPOs over those going to the 
EPO for each country of origin. For Germany 
this number is 1.75, indicating that for every 
patent granted by EPO to a German company 
1.75 are granted by an NPO. For France this 
ratio is 3.07 while for the US it is 0.48 and 
Japan it is 0.54. Using this metric Spain 
(10.9), Austria (6.79) and Italy (3.58) are the 
outliers from Europe. Meanwhile companies 
from Canada (1.32) and Korea (1.01) behave 
very differently from those from the US and 
Japan.  This is remarkable as it suggests that 
companies from some non-EU countries rely 
much less on the EPO than we might expect. 
Some more detail on how companies 
from different countries use the NPOs is 
provided in Figure 4. This shows that DPMA 
is often used by applicants that are not 
situated in Germany. It also shows that INPI 
(FR) and IPO UK (GB) are important 
destinations for patent applications from 
inside and outside Europe.  
 
Figure 4: Frequency of patent applications at NPOs (2008-
2012). Size of circles indicates how often applicants who 
first submitted a patent to a priority office (x-axis) then 
submitted to each NPO (y-axis). Assigning nationality to the 
company on the basis of priority office is slightly different 
than relying on country codes for companies themselves. 
Most often the two are the same.  
While US companies prefer IPO UK 
to INPI by a large margin, Japanese 
companies are evenly split and German and 
Spanish companies somewhat prefer INPI. 
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We do not include a similar graph for the 
period 1998-2002. Comparison of the above 
with this second graph reveals that Japanese 
and US companies reduced the number of 
direct applications to national offices in the 
decade between 2000 and 2010. 
We can also compare how companies 
validated patents granted by EPO across 
national offices. This is done in Figure 5. This 
reveals that DPMA (DE), INPI (FR) and IPO 
UK (GB) are the most important offices for 
validation, mirroring choices made by 
companies that rely just on NPOs. However, 
validations at the smaller national offices in 
Europe are far more significant than direct 
applications regardless of the origin of the 
applicant.  
 
 
Figure 5:Frequency of validation at NPOs. Size of circles as 
in Figure 4. 
To complete this analysis of the 
origin of the applicants at EPO and NPOs 
Figure 6 shows the share of applications at 
EPO/ the NPOs that arose from companies of 
a specific country.  
Figure 6 shows that the share of 
applications at EPO due to companies from 
                                               
8 Pure patent counts are generally a very poor indicator of innovation activity, but the simultaneous decline of patents 
coming from UK firms at all offices in the EU is noteworthy, especially when compared to the experience of France, 
Germany and Italy in the same period. We provide further analysis of this question in Figures 9,10 &11 below.  
Germany, France and Italy steadily increased 
from 2000 to 2010 while the share of US and 
Japanese applications at EPO fell 
significantly. Meanwhile the share of US 
applications at the NPOs increased slightly 
and that of Japanese applications fell slightly. 
Figure 6 also shows that the share of 
applications due to companies from Great 
Britain decreased both at EPO and at the 
NPOs.8 
 
 
Figure 6: Share of applications at EPO and National Offices 
in four different years made by companies from countries 
indicated on graph. 
 
Technology focus 
The technological focus of an 
applicant company cannot be entirely 
separated from the origin of the company. It 
has been documented previously that the 
industrial structure of different capitalist 
economies varies significantly [Hall & 
Soskice, (2001); Casper & Soskice (2004)]. 
Some of the differences in the behaviour of 
companies from different countries which the 
previous section documents may therefore 
arise from differences in industry structure. 
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Here we begin by showing how these 
differences in the use of the patent system 
across industries have evolved over the last 3 
decades. The patent system is frequently 
divided into 5 large and 35 more 
disaggregated technology areas. 9  Figures 7 
and 8 show first that the share of patents 
granted by EPO increased from zero to 
substantial shares between 1978 and 1998. 
Thereafter shares stabilized.  
 
Figure 7: Share of Chemistry patents granted by EPO out of 
all patents granted by EPO and NPOs by technology area. 
 
Figure 8: Share of Mechanical Engineering patents 
granted by EPO out of all patents granted by EPO and NPOs 
by technology area. 
Comparing the two largest main 
areas, Chemicals (22.5% of all patents 
granted in Europe) and Mechanical 
Engineering (34.5%) it emerges above all 
that a larger share of Chemicals patents is 
                                               
9 The scheme according to which patents are sorted into these technologies is provided by Schmoch (2008). 
granted by EPO while the share of 
Mechanical Engineering patents granted 
there has increased to just above 50% only in 
the last decade.  
These averages hide a wide range of 
variation: in Chemicals approximately 80% 
of all patents granted in Europe are granted 
by EPO while only around 50% of patents in 
Environmental Technology are granted by 
EPO. Similarly, around 70% of patents in 
Textiles and Paper Machines are granted by 
EPO but only around 40% in Thermal 
Processes. 
The main explanation for this 
difference is likely to be the ease with which 
innovations protected by patents in 
Chemistry can be reengineered and 
manufactured and the relatively greater costs 
of exploiting innovations protected by 
patents in Mechanical Engineering. This is 
also evident when comparing how widely 
patents are validated when they are granted 
by EPO. We turn to this aspect in the 
following section. 
 
 
Figure 9: Density of patents granted in the EPS in 35 
technology areas by country of origin. For each country the 
symbol is higher, if the share of patents in a technology area 
out of all patents granted to firms from that country is 
greater. 
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First, we return briefly to the question 
of industrial structure by comparing 
patenting behaviour of firms from Germany, 
France and Great Britain. Figure 9 shows 
which technology areas each country had the 
largest exposure to prior to 2000 – with Great 
Britain having a larger share of its patenting 
than France and Germany in Audiovisual, 
Telecom, Optics, Measurement, Control, 
Pharmaceuticals, Materials Chemistry and 
Civil Engineering. 
Figure 10 analyses how patenting 
grew between 1990-2000 and 2004-2014 for 
each technology area. 
 
Figure 10: Growth rate of granted patents across 35 
technology areas by country of origin within the EPS. The 
growth is based on the decade 1990-2000 compared to the 
period 2004-2014. 
The figure clearly shows that 
patenting growth by companies from Great 
Britain lagged behind that in France and 
Germany over this period in almost all 
technology areas. Of the technology areas 
which the UK was comparatively more 
focused on prior to 2000 only 
Pharmaceuticals and Civil Engineering have 
at least a growth rate of patenting on a par 
with the other two economies. There is not a 
single technology area in which the growth 
rate of UK patenting exceeded that of France 
or Germany during this period. This 
underscores the findings from the aggregate 
data reported in Figure 6.  
While this type of analysis is 
suggestive one may remain sceptical of it. 
For instance, the reader may be aware of the 
fact that many innovations protected by 
patents that are in force are not sold on the 
market or used in production. In other words, 
they exist only in order to prevent others from 
marketing these innovations. Having 
observed this fact, it might be that applicants 
from Great Britain are generally less likely to 
hold such patents in their portfolios. To 
address this possibility Figure 11 is based 
only on patents receiving at least 6 citations 
within five years of publication in patents 
issued by EPO. Economists have found 
repeatedly that citations to patents provide a 
rough indication of the economic impact of 
the cited patents [Moser, Ohmstedt, & Rhode 
(2017); Trajtenberg (1990)]. A focus on these 
very highly cited patents should therefore 
provide some indication of the ability of each 
of these economies to generate significant 
innovations. 
 
Figure 11: Highly Cited Patents: Each point is a technology 
area. On the x-axis we plot the share of highly cited patents 
in the area out of all highly cited patents granted to 
companies from that country in 2000. On the y-axis we plot 
the growth in highly cited patents in that area between 1990 
and 2010. The lines are regressions of the growth of 
patenting on the importance of each sector. These reveal that 
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the average growth of highly cited patents across sectors 
was highest in Germany and lowest in Great Britain. 
In Figure 11 we combine the 
approach of the previous two graphs by 
plotting the within country share of highly 
cited patents granted in 2000 in each 
technology area on the x-axis and the growth 
in highly cited patents in each area and 
country between 1990 and 2010 on the y-
axis.10  
The result is very similar to that of the 
previous graphs: companies from Great 
Britain have grown the number of highly 
cited patents at a lower rate than companies 
from France or Germany over the two 
decades between 1990 and 2010. It matters 
little whether a technology area accounts for 
a large or small share of patents in each 
country’s portfolio of highly cited patents.  
When considering why these results 
emerge it may be worth taking into account 
that these three economies are of a different 
size. Next, we show how many highly cited 
patents each country generated in Europe per 
constant trillion, year 2000 US dollars of 
GDP. Table 1 demonstrates that relative to 
the size of the economy Great Britain has for 
a long time produced fewer highly cited 
                                               
10 In response to a query based on this analysis Stuart Graham [Georgia Institute of Technology, and formerly Chief 
Economist at the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO)] analysed patents granted by USPTO to 
companies from Germany, France and Britain. His results confirm that British companies did not obtain increases in 
patents granted by USPTO that are comparable to companies from France or Germany after 2005. 
11 The same ranking emerges from the EU’s Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU (SRIP) report 
2018 where PCT patent applications are used (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/srip-report-chap-1-
4_2018_en.pdf ). 
12 One way of demonstrating this is to look at the share of R&D in gross domestic spending in GDP in these countries: 
https://data.oecd.org/chart/5iz4 (last accessed on 17.9.2018). A similar picture emerges when only the Business 
financed share of R&D is considered. A recent report by IPO UK provides additional detail on UK investments in 
R&D (IPO UK, 2017).  
13 Hall B. , Helmers, Rogers, & Sena, 2013 document that rather few companies in the UK use the patent system. A 
recent report by EU IPO on trade secrets and patenting shows that the proportion of firms relying on patents in 
Germany is 20% points higher there (47.8% v 27.3%): https://bit.ly/2tPjawW 
 
patents than either France or Germany. Note 
that in this period the manufacturing share of 
GDP in France and Great Britain declined 
from around 16% to 10%. Meanwhile in 
Germany it has remained at around 20%. The 
explanation for the large difference in the 
number of highly cited patents generated 
between France and Great Britain cannot be 
due to this factor. 
 
 DE FR GB 
1990 1967.30 2533.35 1172.60 
2000 2259.04 1862.38 808.99 
2010 3108.78 2707.56 828.28 
Table 1: Highly cited patents per trillion, constant 2000 US 
$. Data on GDP from OECD.11 
It is well documented by OECD that both 
public and private R&D investment levels in 
the UK have been significantly lower than 
those in France or Germany since the early 
1980’s. 12  The findings we outline here 
suggest that this difference in R&D 
investment has had a material effect on 
patenting by companies from Great Britain.13 
What we do not know is whether this has also 
affected their productivity and thereby wealth 
and growth in Great Britain. Overall the 
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analysis suggest that a detailed analysis of 
this question is warranted.  
 
Number of Countries 
The focus of this section is the 
number of countries in which each patent 
granted by EPO is validated. In the previous 
section we showed that the share of patents in 
Europe granted by EPO is higher on average 
in Chemistry related technologies than in 
those of Mechanical Engineering.  
 
Figure 12: Chemicals - Distribution of validations by year. 
One explanation for this is the greater 
need to protect innovations in Chemistry in 
each country in Europe to prevent parallel 
imports. This means that the advantage from 
using EPO is felt particularly keenly by 
companies that require a wide territorial 
coverage for their patents. 
Figure 12 shows that as the number of 
member states within the EPS increased over 
time so did the number of countries in which 
firms validated patents in Chemistry. The 
distribution of validations is bimodal in this 
field: one set of patents is validated on 
average in six countries, whilst there is a 
second maximum close to or at the maximum 
number of countries in which a patent can be 
validated. This maximum increases over time 
as more countries join the EPS. 
In contrast patents granted in 
Mechanical Engineering have continuously 
been validated in 4 or 5 countries on average 
as is shown in Figure 13. There is a tail 
reaching the maximally possible number of 
validations, but the number of cases for 
which this tail is reached is quite small. 
 
 
Figure 13: Mechanical Engineering - Distribution of 
validations by year. 
Figures 4 and 5 above indicated that 
some countries are more frequently chosen as 
places to validate a patent than others. The 
Figures also revealed that companies which 
patent only at NPOs prefer the same countries 
as those using the EPO. Most frequently 
these are Germany, France and Great Britain, 
which we refer to as the core countries.  
Figures 14 and 15 below provide an 
insight into the combinations of countries 
which applicants rely on most frequently 
when validating patents in the EU. The 
choice of the set of countries in which to 
validate can be seen as a vector in the space 
of countries: the validation vector. Figure 14 
shows how frequently the most popular such 
vectors were used. It shows that after the mid 
90s the most frequently used validation 
vector is the core countries (DE, FR, GB). 
More recently combinations of the core with 
Italy have also become popular.  
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The figure also shows that earlier in 
the history of the EPO many patents were 
validated in a much larger set of countries, 
which we refer to as the “main” set of 
countries. Occasionally applicants validate 
only in a subset of the core, usually Germany 
and one of the other two countries – the 
increased popularity of the combination of 
Germany and France over the combination of 
Germany and GB most likely accounts for 
why more companies now validate in France 
than in Great Britain. 
 
Figure 14: Validation vectors at EPO based on patents 
granted by EPO and validated in at least one country 
within the EPS. 
 
 
Figure 15: National application and grant vectors. 
Usually we would expect companies 
that are only seeking patent protection in two 
European countries to rely on the NPOs. 
Figure 15 shows that cases in which this 
arises are quite rare. The vast majority of 
patents granted by the NPOs do not have a 
second or third patent in the family that is 
granted by another European NPO. Where 
such patent pairs do arise, they usually get 
filed at the offices of the core countries noted 
above. 
 
Examination Durations and Grant 
Propensity 
Whenever a company intends to 
protect its patent only in a few select 
countries, the decision whether to apply to 
EPO or a set of NPOs may be driven by the 
probability that the patent will be granted or 
by the length of time it takes the office to 
grant the patent. These two variables are 
interrelated: offices that examine a patent in 
great detail may take longer to grant 
everything else being equal. In addition, the 
company applying for the patent may have an 
interest to obtain a patent grant very quickly 
or more often as late as possible. The longer 
the company can keep the final version of the 
patent document open, the more 
opportunities it has of adapting that text to 
cover commercially valuable applications. 
This means that the following figures present 
data that are the result of patent office 
procedures and company choices. This 
makes it hard to draw firm conclusions from 
these figures about the performance of the 
offices. 
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Figure 16: National office grant rates by year of patent 
application. 
We begin by comparing the grant 
rates of the six largest NPOs. Figure 16 
shows that while DPMA and IPO UK are 
tough venues for applicants, the other four 
offices (INPI (FR), UIBM (IT), OP(AT) and 
OEPM(ES)) grant large proportions of 
patents submitted to them. There may be 
many reasons for these differences – quality 
of applications may differ across offices just 
as much as office procedures do14.  
Turning to Figure 17 it becomes 
apparent that the EPO had a lower granted 
rate than the four “lenient” NPOs and higher 
grant rate than DPMA and IPO UK. The 
figure 17 also reveals that French and 
German applicants who used EPO had about 
the same rate of success there over time, in 
spite of the significantly different grant rates 
at the respective national offices. Assuming 
that examiners at EPO applied the same 
criteria to patents, this may go some way to 
explaining why the ratio of national patents 
to EPO patents held by French firms (3.07) is 
                                               
14 While DPMA (DE), IPO UK (GB), OEPM (ES) and OEP(AT) examine patents substantively, INPI(FR) and UIBM 
(IT) register patents for which a search report is published. Nonetheless INPI grants fewer patents submitted to it than 
either OEPM or OEP. More detail on different offices’ approaches to examination and search are provided by EPO at 
this site (https://www.epo.org/applying/national.html ). WIPO has published an informative policy guide on search 
and examination (http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_guide_patentsearch.pdf).  
 
almost double that of German firms (1.75). 
British firms, like their German competitors 
face a tough domestic office, but also had a 
harder time to obtain patents at EPO than 
French or German firms. 
 
Figure 17: Grant rates at EPO by country of applicant. 
This may be partly due to industry 
composition, but it is interesting to note the 
stability of the difference in grant rates 
between German/French and British firms as 
the EPO became stricter after 1996. Note also 
that while the grant rate for Italian applicants 
at EPO was similar to that for British 
applicants until 1996, it is now much closer 
to that for French, German or Austrian 
applicants.  
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Figure 18: Examination duration at EPO by country of 
origin of the applicant. 
The reason for the fall in the grant 
rates at EPO can be found in the increase in 
applications and resulting longer 
examination durations at EPO in the 1990s. 
This led to calls for reform that ultimately 
resulted in lower grant rates as seen in Figure 
17. Figure 18 shows that examination 
durations at EPO increased sharply for 
patents submitted around 1995, regardless of 
the country of origin of the applicant. 
Meanwhile the examination duration 
at NPOs was significantly lower throughout 
this period, even at the “tougher” NPOs in 
Britain and Germany. It is hard to imagine 
that this was due solely to differences in 
applicant behaviour. Note that Figure 19 
reveals that applications at INPI were granted 
more quickly than those at DPMA and IPO 
UK over almost the entire period under 
consideration, just as one would expect, if 
INPI was being less exacting of applicants 
than the other two offices. Data for UIBM 
(IT) reported here is suspect as is also the 
case for Figure 16 above. 
 
Figure 19: Examination duration at NPOs 
 
Summary and Discussion 
The EPS has operated in its current 
form since 1978. In this time there has been a 
shift of patenting away from the NPOs 
towards EPO. The volume of patent grants 
has remained high at the largest NPOs 
indicating that many companies obtain a 
valuable service from these NPOs. This paper 
has documented that some applicants use 
both the EPO and the NPOs in parallel. 
Harhoff, Garanasvili, & von Graevenitz 
(2018) show that fee changes at EPO or 
NPOs induced some applicants to switch 
between EPO and the NPOs. They also show 
that this affects the examination durations of 
patents submitted by other companies. In sum 
these results show that within the EPS the 
largest NPOs and EPO are complementary 
insitutions: where one becomes less attractive 
companies can fall back on the other. It seems 
highly likely that this applies not just to fees 
but also to examination duration and 
examination quality. 
 To date the patent granting 
institutions within the EPS do not coordinate 
fee setting, hiring of examiners or the 
examination procedure they apply. This lack 
of coordination leads to externalities that 
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create costs for companies using the EPS. 
Our analysis suggests that the EPS could 
contribute better to the productivity of the 
European economy if greater coordination 
were achieved. Our analysis does not suggest 
that the NPOs are redundant. 
 
Data and Methodology 
In this section we provide some more 
detail on how the data we use was 
constructed. We also discuss some results we 
obtained on parallel patenting within the 
EPS. 
 
Cleaning and Matching Applicant Names 
To link applicants’ names across 
offices we standardized and aggregated 
portfolios within the EPO and the national 
data separately. Having completed this step, 
we then linked portfolios across the two 
datasets. Standardisation and aggregation 
proceeded in four steps: first, we 
standardized all names, cleaning out 
punctuation marks and standardizing legal 
forms15; next we aggregated portfolios within 
the EPO data and the national data using a file 
derived from Derwent’s encoding of patent 
applicants 16 ; third we aggregated all 
remaining patents using standardized names. 
Finally, we then checked the largest 
remaining portfolios and assigned these to 
firm groups identified previously, where this 
was appropriate. 
The remaining patents were assigned 
to firms on the basis of firms’ standardised 
names. Overall, we have 521564 separate 
                                               
15We used files originally created by Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmers for this. We are grateful to them for sharing 
these files. 
16 15 This file contains code to identify company groups. We found 4094 firm groups in the EPO data and 5684 firm 
groups in the national office data. As the firm sets don’t overlap entirely we have 5905 separate company groups in 
our data. 
firms in the data with 82078 in the EPO data 
and 521533 in the national office data. 
Linking of portfolios across the two 
main datasets (EPO and national offices) 
proceeded in three steps: first, we appended 
the national data to the EPO data, next we 
linked the firm group identifiers from the 
national data to the EPO data for all those 
instances in which patents in the same patent 
family existed at EPO and national offices 
and we had either assigned the same Derwent 
code or the same standardized name to both 
patents. We then extended the national firm 
group identifiers to all EPO patents within the 
firm groups at EPO. 
We checked the results of this 
procedure by inspecting the standardized 
names in the largest ten portfolios thus 
created. Next, we manually checked the 
largest portfolios of patents within EPO that 
we had not assigned a national firm identifier 
and manually attached such identifiers on the 
basis of firms’ names where appropriate. 
Finally, we created firm identifiers based on 
standardised names for those firms in the 
EPO data that had not yet been assigned a 
firm identifier. 
Overall there are 3,524,218 granted 
patents in the dataset we have constructed. 
 
Double Patenting 
One quirk of the EPS is the possibility 
that one patent application submitted to one 
or more NPOs and to the EPO may be granted 
by both. Due to differences in procedures the 
patents are not usually granted at exactly the 
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same time. When the same patent is granted 
by EPO and an NPO it is theoretically 
possible that the owner obtains two versions 
of the patent in one jurisdiction. National 
patent laws in Europe differ as to what 
happens next: in Germany and France the 
national patent automatically loses validity 
when the EPO patent is finally granted, while 
in several other jurisdictions the national 
patent (e.g. Austria, Sweden) both patents 
remain valid. 
Double patents arise for good 
reasons: as illustrated in Figure 18 EPO takes 
longer to grant than the NPOs on average. 
Some applicants may therefore prefer to 
obtain an earlier national grant, while 
wrangling with EPO over the final text of the 
patent that is then extended to EPS member 
states and the home country.  
We have found that almost 69% of 
double patents are granted by either DPMA 
(79,334) or INPI (94,554) for patents with an 
application date before 2011. Figure 20 
shows that the vast majority of such cases are 
those for which the national grant date 
precedes that at EPO. The median difference 
is around 2 years for patents first granted by 
DPMA, INPI and UIBM. It may be 
interesting to note that the examination 
duration at EPO of patents for which a 
national patent is granted is shorter by almost 
1 year than that of patents for which no 
national patent is granted. The portfolios of 
firms that obtain double patents tend to be 
smaller on average than those of firms that 
drop the national applications before grant. 
Both findings suggest that double patents are 
a form of insurance for smaller applicants. 
15% of patents granted by DPMA and 
23% of patents granted by INPI were 
subsequently also granted by EPO in the 
period we study.  
 
 
Figure 20: Difference between grant date at EPO and grant 
date at INPI(blue)/DPMA(yellow)in years for patents 
granted by both EPO and the NPO. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Granted patents by office 
Office Nat 1982 1992 2002 2012 1978 -     
       2013 
EPO EP 5638 32021 49891 69154 1236951 
DPMA DE 10468 17406 18201 13547 529360 
INPI FR 8257 11286 9579 13673 415143 
IPO 
UK GB 18664 9380 9090 6222 326768 
UIBM IT 11 4465 6260 6023 223660 
OP AT 3894 11358 1845 2299 161991 
OEPM ES 4723 2719 1550 4060 105758 
IGE CH 1892 1882 972 449 65178 
RVO NL 84 696 2966 1972 48594 
PRV SE 9 34 2700 977 37396 
OPRI BE 4039 7 0 0 33910 
Total  57679 91254 103054 118376 3184709 
Note:  This table lists the number of patents 
granted by the 10 largest NPOs within the 
EPS (by total grants) in the years 1978-2012. 
Notice that the Belgian office has not granted 
patents since 1988 and is included here by 
virtue of the volume of patents granted prior 
to that year. The table is ordered by the total 
number of patents granted between 1978 and 
2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Largest Portfolios at EPO and NPOs 
 
Company 
Patent 
Stock Company 
Patent 
Stock 
    
SIEMENS 24846 SIEMENS 33210 
ROBERT BOSCH 14684 ROBERT BOSCH 19095 
PHILIPS 14676 DAIMLER 17223 
BASF 13679 MITSUBISHI 11790 
MATSUSHITA EL. 11969 PEUGEOT CITROEN  11108 
CANON  11696 VALEO VISION 9682 
BAYER  10868 L'OREAL 9550 
IBM 9539 RENAULT  8931 
SONY  9205 GENERAL ELECTRIC 8845 
HITACHI  8384 PHILIPS  8290 
TOSHIBA 7384 SAMSUNG 7622 
ERICSSON 7383 
COM. A EN. 
ATOMIQUE 7584 
SAMSUNG 7270 HONDA  6401 
DU PONT 7256 MANNESMANN  6155 
HONDA MOTOR  7188 AIRBUS 6138 
TOYOTA  7144 INFINEON  5793 
3M 6893 SONY  5467 
FUJITSU 6827 THOMSON CSF 5215 
GENERAL 
ELECTRIC  6703 FRAUNHOFER GES 5160 
NEC  6477 ALCATEL 4776 
ALCATEL 5680 RHONE POULENC 4559 
EASTMAN KODAK  5580 CANON  4528 
FUJI PHOTO  5540 ABB 4405 
HOECHST  5098 AUDI  4174 
NOKIA  5094 
INST. FR DU 
PETROLE   3962 
Note: This table lists the largest portfolios of 
patents granted by EPO and the NPOs. In 
bold those companies that are not listed on 
the other side of the table. This does not 
imply that those companies have no patents 
granted by EPO/ an NPO. Only that those 
portfolios are too small to put the company in 
the top 25. 
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Table 3 
Largest Countries Portfolios at EPO and 
NPOs 
 
 EPO NPOs 
Rank CC Count CC Count 
     
1 US 316395 DE 530764 
2 DE 303732 FR 357929 
3 JP 260988 IT 167997 
4 FR 116440 US 153160 
5 GB 57510 GB 148179 
6 CH 54200 JP 142578 
7 IT 46932 AT 109864 
8 NL 42986 CH 83222 
9 SE 30818 ES 74683 
10 AT 16173 NL 53768 
11 KR 15721 SE 44164 
12 CA 15011 BE 29750 
13 BE 13367 AU 19875 
14 FI 12893 CA 19770 
15 DK 10069 KR 15842 
16 ES 6851 TW 10371 
17 AU 6609 FI 7691 
18 CN 5641 SU 7055 
19 IL 5074 HU 5416 
20 NO 4300 DK 4904 
Note: CC stands for Country Code. The 
countries in bold are those from outside 
Europe. SU, stands for Soviet Union. Hardly 
any patents were granted with this code after 
1998.  
 
 
